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Abstract
In this article, I aim to provide an account of the peculiar
reasons that motivate our negative reaction whenever we
see musical instruments being mistreated and destroyed.
Stephen Davies has suggested that this happens because
we seem to treat musical instruments as we treat human
beings, at least in some relevant respects. I argue in favour
of a different explanation, one that is based on the nature
of music as an art form. The main idea behind my account
is that musical instruments are not mere tools for the
production of art; rather, they are involved in an essential
way in artistic appreciation of music. This fact not only
grounds our negative reaction to their mistreatment and
destruction but also has a normative force that is lacked by
the account proposed by Davies.
Matteo Ravasio is a PhD candi-
date at the University of Auckland,
New Zealand. His research areas are
the philosophy of art and philosophi-
cal aesthetics. He is currently working
on the topic of musical expressiveness
and on music-induced emotions.
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Why do we think it is wrong to destroy or mistreat a
musical instrument, and what grounds our reac-
tions when we see musical instruments being
damaged or destroyed? This is the question Stephen
Davies tries to answer in his essay ‘‘What is the
Sound of one Piano Plummeting?’’1 As far as I am
aware, this article is the first contribution by a
philosopher of music to the issue of instrument
mistreatment. In this article, I briefly summarize
his position and offer an alternative account.
My proposal has the merit, I contend, of showing
how the mistreatment of musical instruments is
essentially related to the role instruments play in
music as an art.
There are various artistic contexts in which
instrument mistreatment or destruction takes
place. This paragraph provides a brief account of
the variety of cases in which musical instruments
have been destroyed or mistreated. Some contem-
porary pieces of music or performance art entail an
improper use of an instrument or even its destruc-
tion. More famously, certain musicians in the world
of popular music, especially rock, have the habit
of sacrificing their instruments to the stage at the
end of their show. Davies names Hendrix, Pete
Townshend and Keith Moon, and the list could of
course be much longer. Jerry Lee Lewis was one of
the first artists in popular music to destroy an
instrument, setting fire to his piano at the end of a
show. Deep Purple guitarist Ritchie Blackmore
used to involve in the spiral of destruction his
Marshall amplifier too. Guitar smashing is certainly
the most infamous pastime of rock musicians, but
other instruments are sometimes involved, as
Moon’s example shows. (He was the drummer in
the band The Who.) Paul Simonon of The Clash
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destroyed his bass on stage, an act immortalized in a
photograph that became the cover of the band’s
album London Calling (1979). It is unsurprising to
find instances of musical instrument mistreatment
and destruction in a nihilistic and self-destructive
aesthetics such as the one that characterized the
punk movement. Moving to metal music, we find a
characteristic shift in the attitude toward instru-
ment mistreatment. A more regulated lifestyle than
the one favoured by the musicians of the 60s and
70s often accompanies the high level of virtuosity
often showcased by players of this genre. This
different approach to music making, seen perhaps
more as a profession rather than as a self-expression
and social critique, is perhaps what is behind
the relative lack of popularity of guitar smashing
in the metal world. There are, however, relevant
exceptions. Neoclassical metal guitarist Yngwie
Malmsteen has destroyed guitars on stage in a
way that closely resembles the guitar smashing
acts performed by Ritchie Blackmore, one of
Malmsteen’s musical heroes. Moreover, I have
personally seen Malmsteen snapping one by one
the six strings of his Fender Stratocaster*a
less brutal mistreatment than the usual smash,
but equally an example of apparently gratuitous
violence on the instrument.
The German industrial metal band Rammstein
provides another instance of musical instrument
destruction. At the end of some live performances
of the song Los, keyboard player Christian Lorenz
‘‘Flake’’destroyed a portable keyboard by smashing
it on the stage. This is not the only act of violence
represented in the German band’s performances.
During the song Bu¨ck dich, Flake engages in
a pretence act of sodomy with singer Till
Lindemann, who has a plastic dildo tied to his
waist. As happened with the cases of musical
instrument destruction in high art and punk music,
we find here that the practice of destroying instru-
ments is often related to a more general presenta-
tion of violence in an artistic context.
Moving away from metal, a recent example of
instrument destruction is provided by Matthew
Bellamy of the band Muse. Bellamy retains the
Guinness world record for the number of guitars
smashed in a single tour, with a remarkable 140
destroyed instruments.
As anticipated, high art also offers examples of
musical instruments mistreatment and destruction.
In the piece One for Violin Solo (1962), Fluxus
artist Nam June Paik smashes a violin on a table
after having slowly lifted it over his head for five
minutes. Al Hansen, another member of Fluxus,
destroyed a piano in the performance artwork
Yoko Ono Piano Drop, in which the instrument is
dropped from a tall building. More recently,
Christian Marclay has produced a video installa-
tion entitled Guitar Drag (2000). The installation
consists in the footage of an amplified electric
guitar being dragged through a rugged rural
landscape by a pickup truck.
Seeing a musical instrument being mistreated or
destroyed provokes strong reactions in musicians
and music lovers alike. Even those who enjoy
watching their favourite guitar hero smashing a
guitar on the floor would probably concede that
destroying instruments is excusable only under
particular circumstances, which compensate, as it
were, for the loss and make it acceptable, although
not something that should be done in a light-
hearted manner. Once we have stated the fact,
though, we are left with the need for an explanation.
In many cases, objects are destroyed and we do not
seem to have anything against it. When we change
the expensive tyres of our cars, we do not typically
hesitate when it is time to separate from them and we
do not think about the fate that awaits them, after the
loyal service they have offered us. Moreover, in those
cases in which we consider it wrong to destroy
objects, were it only because ‘‘it’s a waste,’’ we do not
seem to have reactions as strong as the visceral
feeling that we experience when we see a musical
instrument purposely ruined or even destroyed.
To account for these reactions, Davies suggests
three hypotheses, which he subsequently rejects,
and finally proposes a fourth. This last idea,
qualified and refined, constitutes the bulk of what
I call the honorary person theory, which is how Davies
intends to account for the special regard we have
toward musical instruments.
As some readers might not be familiar with
Davies’s position, I briefly review the three theories
he rejects, along with the main objections raised
against them. For the sake of clarity, I took the
liberty to assign a name to each of the proposals.
1. The value theory. Instruments are valuable
objects. They might be handcrafted and, in this
case, each of them is unique. Mass-produced
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instruments coming straight from the assem-
bly line can also have high monetary value,
and they are often checked by experts who
ensure that they meet certain standards of
quality. That is why we do not want instru-
ments to be mistreated or destroyed. Davies
points out how this account does not explain
why we would cringe at seeing the destruc-
tion of cheap plastic recorders, nor*more
importantly*why we consider it bad to do
certain things which do not cause any perma-
nent damage to the instrument but imply its
mistreatment.
2. The tool theory. We could suggest that our
reaction to instrument mistreatment is similar
to the one we have when we see tools being
used inappropriately. A skilled carver is not
likely to be pleased by the view of an expensive
wood chisel being used to open a can of baked
beans. Likewise, music lovers cringe when
they see objects made for the purpose of music
making being mistreated or destroyed. Davies
observes that this theory does not allow us to
understand why we find it uncomfortable to
see a piano being burnt, even when we know
that the instrument has already been damaged
beyond repair by time. If the lack of usefulness
as a tool does not inhibit our reaction, then the
reaction must be grounded in something other
than, as it were, the instrumental value of
instruments.
3. The tradition theory. To be able to accommo-
date the fact that even unplayable instruments
deserve some respect, we might want to
suggest that instruments are to be respected
in virtue of the long tradition they represent.
A modern violin carries in its organological
features the signs of a long history of modifica-
tions, during which masterpieces have been
written for its musical ancestors. A broken-
down violin is still to be paid respect as a
representative of that tradition. However,
as Davies notices, not all musical instru-
ments have such a long history or impor-
tant musical pieces written for them. Yet we
would not forgive somebody for smashing a
Theremin on the ground that it is a recent
inventionwith comparatively fewworks employ-
ing it, or, similarly, for snapping the strings
of a Chapman stick without a good reason.
After having rejected these views, Davies pro-
poses the theory he favours. According to it, we
regard musical instruments as ‘‘honorary persons.’’
Particularly, it is common to refer to the instrument
as an extension of the player’s body. It seems that we
are willing, although of course only metaphorically,
to endow it with the same life we recognize in the
musician, and consequently, we are bound to treat
it with the same respect we treat him. The intimacy
between the instrumentalist and his instrument is a
kind of bond which is strengthened by hours of
daily practice and goes well beyond the mere
relation between, say, the car keys and its possessor.
If the instrument is to be treated like a living being,
then it is clear why we value it intrinsically, not
because of its instrumental value, its lineage, or
monetary value.
This view has problems as well, and Davies
readily admits that we need to refine it if we want
to defend it from criticism. He points to two
reasons why his theory could be considered
problematic.
Firstly, when human beings are damaged in one
of their bodily parts, the object or our compassion
is not the part that got damaged or was lost, but
the patient, that is, the actual person to whom the
part belongs to. If the blame associated with the
mistreatment of instruments is a consequence of
thinking of the instrument as a part of the
musician’s body, our concern should be directed
to the musician, but this is clearly not the case.
Secondly, the fortunately rare cases in which
mutilations and damages are inflicted (normally
self-inflicted) to human beings for the purpose of
art production are regarded as worse than the
damage or destruction of musical instruments.
Davies mentions the Wiener Aktionismus, a group
of artists that, in the 1960s, manifested its opposi-
tion to the values of the Austrian middle class by
means of performance art involving mutilations,
self-inflicted injuries, public masturbation and
defecation.
Nonetheless, Davies believes that there is a
relevant sense in which the analogy with human
mutilation can actually explain our attitude toward
musical instruments. He asks us to imagine a knife
cutting into the skin of a completely anaesthetized
arm or the bistoury of the surgeon entering a dead
body at the start of an autopsy. Nobody is actually
getting hurt, and everyone is doing their duty, yet
Destruction of musical instruments
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we focus on the damaged part rather than on the
individual, and seeing it undergoing such a process
triggers an unpleasant reaction. This reaction,
Davies argues, is one that is tied to the value we
attribute to personhood and is similar to the one we
have when we see instruments being damaged or
destroyed.
In the remainder of this article, I suggest a
different account of our attachment to musical
instruments. I believe that this account avoids a
number of objections that could be raised against
the honorary person theory. These will be dis-
cussed while I present and defend my account,
which I call artistic value theory.
The final part of the article is devoted to
distinguishing two cases in which an instrument
can be mistreated. These two cases are laid out in
the examples already offered: sometimes, the
destruction or improper use of an instrument is
part of a certain musical composition; other times,
musicians make the destruction of an instrument a
part of their live shows, without apparently thinking
of their guitar smashes as a part of their songs. I try
to explore our intuitions about this difference and
our evaluation of it and briefly suggest a way in
which my account could make sense of artworks
involving the mistreatment or destruction of musi-
cal instruments.
I suggest that we think of instruments as some-
thing that should not be mistreated or destroyed
because of the same reasons why works of art, in
general, are not to be mistreated or destroyed. One
should not scratch a fresco, nor drop a portrait, or
set fire to a wooden sculpture. Mistreating these
works of art in ways which do not entail their
permanent damage would normally also be re-
garded as inappropriate, albeit less blameworthy
than compromising the object’s properties irreme-
diably. One should not spit on a marble statue,
although saliva is hardly likely to damage it.
Similarly, one should try to avoid planting flowers
in a precious Chinese ceramic vase. The underlying
assumption behind these precepts seems to be the
following: what has artistic value is to be paid a
certain reverence and respect. We should avoid
doing certain things to artworks, even if these
actions do not have long-lasting consequences for
the artwork or do not hinder people from appre-
ciating it.
Extending these moral precepts to musical in-
struments for the reason I just suggested might
seem at first puzzling. After all, musical instru-
ments are not artworks in themselves, were it only
for the fact that we take music’s medium to be
sound, and instruments are not sound, they are*
unsurprisingly*the instruments, that is, the tools,
which allow us to produce that sound.2 It would be
strange to regard Giotto’s brush as part of the fresco
we can admire in the Arena chapel in Padua.
However, music is a performance art. This fact
implies that musical instruments do not have the
same role as the painter’s brush or the sculptor’s
chisel. Seeing or hearing the action of the performer
on his instrument is a relevant part of our experi-
ence of music, or at least this can be the case. When
we listen to music, we are sometimes able to see the
unfolding of the work by appreciating the perfor-
mer’s action on the instrument. Before the advent
of technologies that allowed music to be recorded
and subsequently replayed, whenever there was
music there also had to be someone playing close
enough for us to hear them. Even in those cases in
which we do not actually see the instrument being
played*as happens with audio recordings*the
musician’s action on the instrument is part of the
unfolding of the musical piece we are listening to. I
think that every music lover who is also a player,
even at the most amateurish level, has felt the desire
to be able to view the performance of a virtuoso on
the instrument that they are familiar with, whereas
an excellent performance on an instrument we do
not know well leaves us less impressed, because we
are not able to fully appreciate the musician’s skills.
Philip Alperson has stressed the crucial importance
of the ‘‘instrumentality’’ of music: appreciating the
performance of a musical work is to appreciate the
work-in-performance, that is, the work of music as
presented by the musician through his/her action
on the instrument. From this point of view, a
number of properties of the piece depend on the
appreciation of the relationship between the per-
former and the musical instrument. Alperson notes
that: ‘‘Musical instruments play a key role in our
appreciation of many of the skills of music making.
When we think of a musician’s virtuosity or even of
his/her expressiveness or musicality, we think of
these things as specifically tied up with what he/she
does with the particular instrument he/she plays.’’3
These observations do not mean anything precise
for the ontological side of the problem; they just
point to the fact that the instrument’s role in music
is different from the role a brush has in painting.
M. Ravasio
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Its role is not that of mere instrumentality, because
the actions of the player on it and his/her mastery of
its expressive possibilities are the subject of our
attention and of our artistic appreciation. It is
worth noticing how the ‘‘tool theory’’ discussed
above seemed to anticipate some of these concerns.
According to it, our reaction to the destruction of
musical instruments is negative because of their
values as music-producing tools. This idea is not
incorrect, although it needs to be qualified. As
suggested by Alperson’s reflections, musical instru-
ments are not mere tools. They share with tools
their instrumental role in the production of music:
we need instruments to make music. Unlike
ordinary tools, however, the appreciation of the
final product (music) requires the appreciation of
the musician’s work with his/her tools, that is, the
appreciation of his/her mastery of musical instru-
ments. It is on this functional shift of tools*from
being mere means to an end to being a very part of
what they produce*that I intend to ground a
different account of instrument mistreatment and
destruction.
I believe that music instruments should not be
mistreated or destroyed because they can be the
object of artistic appreciation in a sense in which
the painter’s brush cannot and in a sense that
transcends the fact that one might aesthetically
appreciate the instrument as a handcrafted object
(as one could appreciate a beautifully crafted
chair). This appreciation is related to the possibi-
lity of the instrument’s being played and that
possibility makes disrespect toward the instru-
ment similar to a blameworthy lack of respect
toward a fresco or a statue. Let’s call this view the
artistic value theory.
It is important at this point to stress a relevant
difference between my account and the honorary
person theory. Whereas Davies is offering what
looks like a psychological rationale for our reac-
tion to the mistreatment and destruction of music
instruments, my account has a direct normative
force. Under the assumption that one ought not to
destroy or damage artworks in virtue of their role
in artistic appreciation, the artistic value theory
both explains why we react negatively when
instruments are mistreated and enjoins us not to
mistreat or destroy musical instruments.
There is one objection Davies might raise. He
rightly points to the fact that burning an old
useless piano, on which no beautiful music can be
played anymore, is equally regarded as wrong.
The artistic value theory does not seem to be able
to account for this. If an instrument cannot be
successfully played, there is no possible artistic
value to get from it. I suggest three answers to this
objection.
Firstly, some of our reactions to mistreated or
destroyed unplayable instruments might be more
grounded on the reverence we generally have for
old objects, especially ancient objects, rather than
on the specific musical quality of that object.
I would not mind throwing away a broken chair
I bought a few weeks ago, but I have to admit that
getting rid of an old and modestly crafted piece of
furniture which belonged to people who are long
gone would require of me some effort, even in the
case in which I did not know anything about them.
That piece of furniture was part of somebody’s
life; it was used, touched and repaired. Perhaps,
it witnessed some of the events which shaped those
people’s lives. In Davies’ article, this feeling is aptly
mirrored by the reaction a composer had to the
piece Piano Burning: ‘‘Somebody must have loved
that piano.’’ That piano was useless as a piano, but it
once was of importance to somebody. Of course,
certain objects are more likely to foster these
reactions. That is probably why one would find it
sadder to see an old pipe being smashed on the
ground or burnt than a chair ending its days in a
similar way. When should then one be able to
distinguish the role played in our consideration by
what we could call the ‘‘antiquarian value’’ of
instruments. Although this kind of value is among
the factors that ground our reaction to the destruc-
tion of instruments, it is not the kind of value that is
specific to music instruments as performance tools.
Secondly, it seems to me that the destruction of
an unusable piano should still be regarded as less
blameworthy than the destruction of a brand new
Steinway (and it normally is so regarded). This, it is
worth noting, applies marginally to human beings.
This answer to Davies’s possible objection draws
attentions to a weakness of the honorary person
theory. Only if pushed by the arguments of the
utilitarian would one admit that one would rather
prefer the death of the old and diseased to that
of the young. Seeing an old man tortured to death is
probably as unsettling and disturbing as seeing
these things done to a young boy, yet this does
not seem to carry over to the case of musical
instrument.
Destruction of musical instruments
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Thirdly, I would like to draw attention to a
possible story involving an unplayable instrument
and look at how this story could favour the one
theory rather than the other. This story allows us to
look closer at another case: that of playable instru-
ments transformed into other instruments. I have
recently seen an advertisement by a player who was
selling his medieval lute. There are no remaining
medieval lutes (though we have a number of lutes
from the Renaissance). Medieval lutes that are
around today are made from scratch. In that case,
an old German lute guitar (a lute-shaped guitar)
was transformed into a medieval lute by a luthier.
That old guitar was unplayable*I do not know the
details, let’s assume it for the sake of the
argument*but instead of restoring it or, worse,
committing it to the flames, the skilled luthier
transformed it into a playable medieval lute. I
suppose it is fair to assume that we all agree about
the moral quality of the luthier’s action. What he
did was good and irreproachable. I believe that the
artistic value theory could account for the moral
quality of this operation better than the honorary
person theory. If the original instrument was to be
paid the same kind of respect we pay to a person,
should not the restoring option be a better one than
the transformation? This might look like stretching
Davies’ metaphor a bit too far, but we cannot deny
that we would consider it better to restore the
original aspect of the instrument rather than to give
it a completely new shape, if we thought of the
instrument as some kind of honorary person. It is
better to use plastic surgery to restore the aspect of a
body part as it was before an accident than using
such surgery to fashion our appearance as we like.
One could speculate that the average music lover
does not clearly prefer either of the two possibilities:
restoring the instrument’s earlier condition or
transforming it into another instrument is some-
thing that leaves him indifferent. This is something
the artistic value theory seems to be able to explain
better than the honorary person theory, which
seems to result in the idea that restoration is
invariably the best option. We are not taking away
that instrument’s personality when we change it
into something else, and this is because the instru-
ment was never, not even metaphorically, thought
of as a person. More importantly, I believe that the
artistic value theory can explain why many people
would agree that turning an old German lute guitar
into a medieval or Renaissance lute is actually a
better choice than restoring its past appearance and
functionality as a guitar. This is so, I suggest,
because of the artistic value the instrument will
acquire in the transformation. There are many
guitars around and several of them are better than
old German lute guitars. If these instruments can
be given the opportunity to disclose to us the
wonders of the lute repertoire, then we would
have no reason to reject the possibility of a trans-
formation; I dare to say that we should strongly
encourage it.
Let us now turn to another story, the one about
instruments being transformed even in the case in
which they are perfectly playable. This is the fate
many Renaissance lutes had to face. This popular
(at the time) instrument typically had six or seven
courses (double strings) in the sixteenth century.
The evolution of musical taste required lutes with a
more extended bass register. In order to achieve
these features, some lutes were modified, and
additional courses were added. This normally
required a modification of the peg box and a
substitution of the bridge. In the case of fretted
courses, the transformation required as well the
substitution of the instrument’s neck. This opera-
tion can hardly be thought of as something re-
proachable and this, I submit, for the same reasons
given above. The music played on the Renaissance
lute was less fashionable: the development of
musical culture in Europe urged that transforma-
tion, and such a transformation was promptly
made. I want to suggest that, in this case too, the
artistic value theory fares better than the honorary
person theory. The instruments in question were
still in perfect health, and yet a change in fashion
caused them to undergo the bistoury of the luthier,
so to speak. There are of course people who regard
this transformation as a baleful thing: early music
lovers. In fact, as a consequence of those transfor-
mations, we do not know as much as we could
about the Renaissance lute. Various lutes from the
Renaissance have survived, but in most cases they
are so heavily modified that we cannot discover
much from them about their original characteris-
tics. Although I am probably one of those who think
that it is a pity not to have more surviving original
instruments, I believe that this feeling is grounded
more on historical and musicological curiosity,
rather than on what I value in instruments. Lacking
those original instruments means lacking a source
of knowledge we would like to possess and perhaps
M. Ravasio
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lacking some more museum artefacts to put at the
right place in a display cabinet. I do not believe that
even the strictest advocate of historically informed
performance would ever blame those luthiers who,
in past centuries, have transformed lutes in the way
described. And if he did, he would probably be
blaming them for their lack of historical conscious-
ness, not for their lack of respect for musical
instruments.
For the reasons expressed in the previous para-
graphs, I believe that the artistic value theory can
better accommodate certain facts about the ordin-
ary things people do with musical instruments
because it can account for our intuitions about
these practices in a more precise way. It is surely
true that we sometimes treat instruments like
human beings. But this is not by itself enough to
see in that behaviour the reason why we do not like
to see them mistreated or destroyed. Moreover, the
artistic value theory can account for the normative
side of our intuition about the unpleasant character
of instrument destruction. Not only do we often
have a strong reaction to the sight of musical
instruments being mistreated and destroyed, we
also consider it as gratuitous wrongdoing.
As a further element in support of the artistic
value theory, I should point to the fact that the
conception of musical instrument as human agents
is not a trans-historical and cross-cultural datum;
rather, it is proper of certain musical contexts, while
it is rejected in others. To substantiate this claim, I
present some relevant cases in which instruments
are seen as analogous to machines, rather than to
human beings. This fact might further undermine
the plausibility of Davies’s approach. Although he
is right in contending that we do sometimes treat
musical instruments as human beings, this is by no
means always the case, and no general explanation
of our reaction to the instrument destruction could
therefore be based on that fact.
Let us first examine two cases in which musical
instruments are treated in ways that present analo-
gies with human agents. Critics discussing the work
Guitar Drag have stressed the anthropomorphic
character of the guitar in that performance. More
specifically, the artist intended to refer to a recent
episode of violence connected with racial hatred, in
which a black man was killed by being dragged
behind a pickup truck, just as it happens to the
instrument featured in Guitar Drag.4 It is common
to refer to parts of musical instruments borrowing
words from human anatomy. A guitar has a ‘‘body’’
and a ‘‘neck,’’ a cello’s ‘‘voice’’ is darker than a
violin’s, and so on. The musician’s relationship
with the instrument is often one that stresses the
quasi-bodily character of instruments, which are
often described as an extension of the player’s own
body. Before the seminal guitar sacrifice performed
on 18 June 1967 at the Monterey Pop Festival, Jimi
Hendrix engaged in what is sometimes considered a
mimicked sexual intercourse, an extreme way to
explicit the anthropomorphic relation with his
Stratocaster.
Anthropologist Eliot Bates stresses how only
certain instruments are considered as agents.
When this happens, however, musical instruments
seem to be endowed with what he calls a ‘‘social
life.’’5 From our point of view, Bates’ perspective
hints to the fact that, although an anthropomorphic
view of musical instrument is widespread, it does
not constitute an anthropological universal and,
when present, is generally limited to certain instru-
ments.
Woody Guthrie implicitly likened his acoustic
guitar to a machine when he famously painted on it
the warning ‘‘This machine kills fascists.’’ Deep
Purple bass player Roger Glover stressed how the
title of their 1972 album Machine Head came from a
general interest for the concept of ‘‘machine’’ and
‘‘metal’’ in music, and is based around the idea of
considering the instrument as a sort of machine
(‘‘head,’’ in the album title, refers to the bass
guitar’s headstock, which figures in the back of
the record’s sleeve). According to Glover, this
anticipated a widespread use of machinery-related
language in rock music, something evident in the
subsequent development of heavy metal.6
Futurism is another case in point, with its
emphasis and praise of technology and machinery.
Futurist aesthetics, rather than being incompatible
with instrument making, inspired Luigi Russolo to
produce a new sort of music instrument, the so-
called intonarumori, an acoustic noise generator.
The German band Kraftwerk adopted a futur-
istic aesthetics inspired by the fast-paced techno-
logical development of the contemporary world.
Their instruments, which represent pioneering
efforts to put electronics to the service of music
making, look often like minimalistic operating
units, stripped bare of anything that could interfere
with the musician’s manipulation of sound.
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As anticipated, I conclude this article by explor-
ing the difference between two cases of instrument
mistreatment and destruction. Let us recall the
distinction in question. Sometimes, instruments
are damaged or destroyed because this is what is
required by the performance of a ‘‘musical’’ piece
or by the performance of some kind of artwork. In
other cases, instruments are destroyed for the sake
of the adrenaline flow that comes with it, as a show
of personal wealth, or as the result of being enraged
with an obnoxious audience or with a cameraman
who gets too close. To make the distinction clear:
Jerry Lee Lewis setting fire to his piano at the end
of the show is a different case of instrument
destruction than Piano Burning, a piece by the
New Zealand born American composer Annea
Lockwood, which requires a piano to be burnt.
What happens to the instrument is more or less the
same thing, and yet there is enough room to trace a
distinction. It is important to notice that, at least in
principle, this distinction is not one between
instrument mistreatment in classical and popular
music: we could equally imagine the case of a
popular music piece that entails the destruction of
an instrument, although no example is known to
me.7 In a similar way, we could imagine a violin
player smashing his instrument on the ground after
a flashy performance of Paganini’s Caprice No. 24 in
A minor, Op. 1*again, though, no actual example
comes to mind.
This issue could be dealt with in several ways. I
should firstly notice that we might reject the
distinction I traced. We could assume that, if we
cannot find relevant differences in the attitude
people have toward the one case or the other, we
should not construe the distinction as relevant.
Alternatively, we could assimilate the two cases by
considering the guitar smashing as a part of a work
of art that is constituted by the concert event. In this
case, the destruction of the instrument would be on
the same ontological safe ground as an improvised
solo. The distinction with pieces with a scored
mistreatment or destruction of an instrument could
therefore be downplayed. However, I assume for
the sake of the argument that the distinction holds.
Note that there does not seem to be a clear-cut
opinion about which case of instrument destruc-
tion is less reproachable. Hard rock fans are not
against seeing a guitar smashed to smithereens at
the climax of a gig*I surely am not. But the same
people also deplore that an instrument of the kind
they have to save money to buy goes to musical
heaven for the silly purpose of showmanship, and
they would also agree that guitar smashing is the
prerogative of guitar heroes only, not something
everyone should do. Their intuition seems to be
that, in some cases, to sacrifice a cheap guitar is not
blameworthy because it enhances the display of
power or rebellious attitude that can be part of rock
aesthetics. In a similar way, people who appreciate
contemporary art are perhaps able to find some
meaning in Javanese gamelan brass pots being filled
with water, as happens in Adrian Sherriff ’s piece A
Little Water Music for Gamelan (1998). It seems thus
that both the extemporary destruction of an
instrument and its planned destruction in the
context of an artwork can be given value and
meaning at least under certain conditions and by
certain people.
In order to substantiate these claims, let us
consider in more detail the case of instrument
destruction in rock music. As suggested above,
this practice can be linked to the aesthetics of
rock music, which has in noise, energy, raw self-
expression and violence some of its defining
characteristics.8 The sacrifice of an instrument
embodies many of these aspects: it is uncontrolled,
frenzied, noisy, and brutal. Equally relevant to rock
music is the fetishist veneration of the fans for the
artist, and again we find a connection with instru-
ment destruction: the audience is often offered
what is left of the instrument as a precious relic
(a term that stresses once again the connection
between the instrument and the musician’s body).
I would like now to offer a more speculative take
on the implicit artistic meaning of instrument des-
truction. Walter Benjamin famously claimed that
the technological reproducibility of art deprived
it of its ‘‘aura,’’ that is, of its unique presence.9
As rock music is mainly consumed through records,
Benjamin’s idea surely applies to the prototypical
rock song as a work of art. My discussion of the role
of instruments has stressed their intimate connec-
tion with music making. It is therefore interesting to
see whether technological reproducibility has also
affected this aspect of musical culture. By far, the
most common case of instrument destruction in
the case of rock and metal music is that involving
a cheap version of the musician’s instrument.
These mass-produced instruments, although
worth a significant amount of money, do not have
the monetary value of the high-end instruments
M. Ravasio
8
(page number not for citation purpose)
played by the artists on stage. They also normally
lack other attributes of the musician’s personal
instruments: they have not been modified in order
to be adjusted to their specific needs; they have not
been personalized with stickers, drawings, or sig-
natures; they do not have the ‘‘lived’’ aspect of the
instruments one has owned and played for years.
These facts could all be of little artistic import and
be simply related to a matter of practical and
financial convenience. However, I wish to suggest
that the destruction of mass-produced instruments
stresses their replaceable quality, as opposed to the
uniqueness of the artist’s personal instrument. The
destruction of the instrument, rather than being
what deprives us forever of the aura of that
particular instrument, is what shows that the
instrument, as a mass-produced object, has never
possessed such a unique presence. The implicit
meaning of acts such as guitar smashing could be
therefore related to the substitutable and replace-
able character of musical instruments in the age of
mass production and distributions of both music
and music-producing tools, set against the musi-
cian’s desire to express his/her uniqueness and non-
substitutability.
From this discussion, it should be clear that the
destruction of musical instruments in rock music,
far from being a wanton display of violence, is
embedded in a complex network of aesthetic and
artistic meanings.
I conclude by suggesting the following scenario
regarding the cases in which instrument mistreat-
ment or destruction is considered part of the
relevant musical piece or, more generally, artwork.
If we think that the artwork in question has artistic
value, then the artistic value theory can deal with
this: the instrument is sacrificed to the production
of artistic value, so its sacrifice is justified. If, on
the contrary, we think that such an artwork lacks
artistic value, the artistic value theory seems still
to fare equally well: the instrument’s destruction is
to be blamed because it has no redeeming out-
come. In other words, the artistic value theory
seems to let us to remain agnostic as to the value
of the artwork requiring the destruction of an
instrument, allowing for different reactions and
norms according to the artistic value of the
artwork in question.10
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